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1 The absent state in disasters
In examining citizen–state interaction during
the 2010 and 2011 floods, this study focuses on
climatic disasters in southern Sindh where they
significantly disrupted the lives and livelihoods of
people. Disasters are inherently political events.
David Easton’s classic characterisation of
politics, describes it as ‘the authoritative
allocation of values’ (Mitchell 1961). If politics is
therefore an allocative framework, it is intuitive
that disasters should be very political indeed,
because values of crucial importance, including
those of survival itself, are being allocated by the
effective action or inaction of ruling regimes
both before, but especially after, the disaster
event (Drury and Ohlson 1998). Most scholars
now agree that vulnerability to disasters ‘is
primarily a socio-political issue rather than a
question of disaster-proof technology’ (Albala-
Bertrand 1993). While most political scientists
and geographers accept that disasters ‘occur in a
political space’ (Cohen and Werker 2008), drive
politics in the disaster-affected region (Simpson
and Corbridge 2006) and alter the political space
available in the post-disaster era (Drury and
Ohlson 1998), it is the latter that this study is
interested in examining, particularly the
‘transformative’ potential of the political space
in the post-disaster context.
This article builds on the work of Pelling and Dill
(2010) that discusses ‘transformative political
space’ after a disaster. Examining the earthquake
in Marmara, Turkey, they identify the disaster as
a ‘tipping point’ or ‘catalyst’ that allowed civil
society and affected communities to contest the
very nature of the social contract between the
state and its citizens. Their framework
(elaborated by Pelling 2011) views disasters as
representing a failure in the social contract and
opening political/civil space for renegotiation, in
structures and processes, between citizens and
the state. Instability sets in when the dominant
actor (duty-bearer) is unable to meet its
responsibilities, leading to an opening in political
space. Redistribution of power then depends on
the manner and rate at which dominant actors
respond to what Habermas refers to as a crisis of
legitimacy and thus an exposed vulnerability in
the social contract (Pelling and Dill 2010). If
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these changes in governable spaces and
renegotiation of rights for human security have a
long-term effect in revising or changing the very
nature of the social contract, it is possible to
conclude that a ‘critical juncture’ has been
reached. This is the point that signifies an
irreversible political change or composition in the
structure of the incumbent regime (Pelling and
Dill 2010). This study then specifically aims to
discuss the nature of this political space in
southern Sindh after the floods of 2010 and 2011
and the disasters as a ‘tipping point’ for change. 
This ‘transformative’ change in the post-disaster
context is to a large extent driven by challenges
presented to the legitimacy and authority of the
state and how the state responds to such a crisis.
Needless to say, if the state disengages from the
disaster altogether or closes this political space
through repression or co-option, the opportunity
presented by this ‘catalyst’ is either lost or only
transitional and unable to sustain itself. The
popular discourse on the Pakistani state after the
floods in 2010 and 2011, however, was the former
– that the state chose to remain ‘absent’ which is
its default position. In previous research on rural
Sindh, Kabeer et al. note that, ‘the government is
largely conspicuous by its absence in the study
villages’, which were located along the main road
from Karachi in Sindh to the border with
Balochistan (Kabeer et al. 2012). This idea that
the state is ‘absent’ is hardly new, or unique to
Sindh and is the dominant narrative for many
parts of rural Pakistan. 
The ‘absent state’ thesis of Kabeer and her
colleagues was developed in a study that
examined the comparative impacts of social
transfers to poor households in Sindh, Pakistan
and in West Bengal, India. Despite a number of
similarities in the two regions, including income
levels of the sample populations, the project had
a significantly greater impact on poverty
reduction in West Bengal than it did in Sindh.
One of the primary reasons identified by the
authors was that the project implementation
agency in Sindh ‘was attempting to address
extreme poverty in a context where the state was
largely absent. Many of the gains that its
participants made were wiped out by forces that
only a functioning state had the capacity to
tackle – inflation in the price of food and raw
materials, and deficits in social and physical
infrastructure’ (ibid.). 
The study also illustrated that while in West
Bengal the ‘distance, accessibility and quality of
service among government health facilities left
much to be desired’, it was still possible for most
participants to seek out and use these
government services. On the other hand, in
Sindh, most interviewees did not have access to
even poor-quality government facilities. Hence,
when participants1 were questioned on what
services they most needed in the village, the
answers almost unanimously stated basic services
such as health care, water or transport (ibid.).
This work on Sindh emphasised that, besides
some water tanks installed by a government
department ten years prior to the study,
participants in the area studied by Kabeer had
never had much interaction with the state. None
of the villages had an electric power supply.
Much like the water tanks, the state had also
once built schools many years before the study
but they were now ‘ghost schools’ either lying
defunct or occasionally used by a local maulvi,2
holding unregistered classes on the premises
(Kabeer et al. 2011). This study demonstrated
that the majority of residents of rural Sindh
seemed to have little interaction with the state.
The narrative that emerged after the worst floods
in Pakistan’s post-19713 history followed this idea
of an ‘absent’ state. These floods had particularly
affected a large proportion of the province of
Sindh in 2010 and at the same time the following
year the floods hit again, this time causing
destruction in different parts of the province. The
dominant discourse, during and post-disaster,
remained that of a failing, if not altogether
‘absent state’. After the floods that affected Sindh
in 2011, international media reports said,
‘Correspondents say the perception is that for a
second year running, the government in
particular has failed flood victims’ (BBC 2011).
Reporting from Sindh, after the 2010 floods, a
journalist described public opinion in the
following words: ‘The tented refugees offered
scathing criticism of their local parliamentarian,
who they said did nothing to help, and the
government in general’ (Walsh 2010).
2 Food security, disaster and citizens
Climatic disasters, such as the floods of 2010 and
2011 in Sindh, also impact food security in the
region; as demonstrated earlier this will affect
political space and the social contract, which will
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be explored in some detail. In a paper examining
the concept of food security in protracted
humanitarian crises, Maxwell et al. describe a
new era in disaster management, one where the
annual number of humanitarian crises is
increasing but fewer people are dying in these
complex emergencies. Instead ‘people are
surviving to lead lives of increased chronic food
insecurity and impaired development’ and ‘while
not all of these crises would be described as “food
emergencies”, virtually all of them impact the
food security of affected populations’ (Maxwell et
al. 2010).
Devereux discusses this negative effect on food
security in the context of Sen’s entitlement
approach. In the context of famines and food
security an ‘entitlement set’ is the full range of
goods and services an individual can exchange
for adequate food. ‘Individuals face starvation if
their full entitlement set does not provide them
with adequate food for subsistence’ (Devereux
2001). By implication then, they would face food
insecurity and malnourishment if their full set of
entitlements provides them with less than
adequate food for healthy development.
Devereux’s work also presents a detailed analysis
of the ‘entitlement failures’ that result as a
consequence of climatic disasters, such as floods
and drought, and emphasises the policy
interventions that can prevent food insecurity or
starvation. His policy solutions comprises a
comprehensive social protection programme
consisting of cash and asset transfers,
employment safety nets and others (Devereux
2007a). While it cannot be argued that the state
interventions after the floods in Sindh included
the full range of measures recommended by
Devereux, partial policy options in the form of
cash transfers were instituted by the state and
were visible in my field sites in the post-disaster
context.
According to the theoretical framework utilised
by this study, the flooding disaster of 2010 and
2011 was clearly a political event that fractured
the social contract between the state and its
citizens. If the state remained ‘absent’ and did
not attempt to use the political space opened up
by the disaster to reach out to its citizens,
entitlement failures and mass starvation should
result. In The New Famines, Devereux argued
against the received wisdom that famines have
‘receded into history’, or that they only occur in
countries that are either dictatorships or at war.
His work presented case studies from countries
in Africa, Asia and Europe, some of which were
‘peaceful democracies’ and where the
contributory causes of the ‘new famines’ ranged
from HIV/AIDS to international sanctions
(Devereux 2007b). Hence it is worth
investigating that, given what we know about
‘new famines’, why did a calamitous disaster such
as the floods of 2010 and 2011, compounded by a
state that was ‘absent’ and did not respond, not
culminate in a climatic disaster-based famine? 
A survey by the Economic Ministry (2011) after
the 2011 floods illustrated that the damage to
crops, livestock, poultry and fisheries was to the
tune of US$1,840.3 million. Sindh suffered the
brunt of this loss with 94 per cent of the total
damage. In the flood-affected villages where I did
fieldwork, it was obvious that families and
communities were still reeling from the loss of
livelihoods and food consumption. In two or
three villages, community members also showed
me areas where even one year after the floods,
fields were still flooded and planting a new crop
was not possible. At the same time, however, all
interviewees acknowledged that they were able
to maintain a level of subsistence; during their
time in the relief camps (whether government or
NGO-run) they received regular supplies of food
and rations. However, since coming back to their
homes regular food supply seemed to be more of
a concern.
I interviewed a middle-aged woman who I will
call Amma. Amma is the resident of a small
village in Badin district. She estimated that she
was 45–50 years of age and that her husband was
about 20 years her senior. Due to his age and
failing health her husband was no longer able to
work, so I asked her where her income came
from. She replied gaily:
For eight to nine months I have had no need for an
income, daughter, I feed my family from the ‘imdaad’
[aid] I received after the floods [in 2011].
When I asked Amma for details of what ‘imdaad’
she received, she mentioned money from the
Watan Card4 in passing but especially emphasised
large quantities (in kilograms) of food rations,
such as wheat flour, rice and cooking oil she
received from state and non-state actors. Amma
also confirmed that she was not worried about
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food insecurity ‘for a while’ as she had enough
‘imdaad’ stored away (pers. comm. May 2012). 
From the interviews and the fieldwork that I did,
it was evident that during the disaster, while
clean drinking water was an issue of concern for
some of the flood-affected individuals, access to
regular meals was not. In fact Interviewee 4 (a
young mother in a village in Thatta) (pers.
comm. June 2012) and Interviewee 5 (a middle-
aged man in a village in Badin) (pers. comm.
May 2012) both said that if the state had not
intervened in the manner that it did
(Interviewee 5 specifically said with ‘bank cards
and rations’), they both independently of each
other used the phrase ‘hum bhookay, mar jatay [we
would have starved to death]’. In other words,
these individuals were crediting state
interventions for preventing food insecurity
during the disaster. The post-disaster situation
however is more complex.
Food insecurity has been considered a crucial
contributor to the political uprisings in the Arab
world in 2011 (Zurayk 2011). A professor at
SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London) made the connection
between the uprising and rising food prices in the
following words: ‘the food-price spike was the
final nail in the coffin for regimes that were
failing to deliver on their side of the social
contract’ (The Economist 2012). Despite two large-
scale disasters in the form of floods in 2010 and
2011, and a general dissatisfaction with the
government and leaders in power, interviewees I
spoke to in the villages in the districts of Thatta,
Badin and Tharparkar did not make any
reference to the state breaking its contract or
abrogating its responsibility to its citizens.
Instead it often seemed that the state used the
disaster to reach out to its citizens and forge a
relationship that previously did not seem to exist.
3 Disasters and the state
I spent four months doing field research in three
flood-affected districts of Lower Sindh in the
summer of 2012. I interviewed 93 individuals and
groups and did participant observations in three
districts of southern Sindh: Thatta (affected by
floods in 2010), Badin and Tharparkar (affected
by floods in 2011). The interviewees’ perceptions
of state interventions post-floods supported this
narrative of an ‘absent’ or incompetent state. I
asked individuals and focus groups in
approximately 50 villages what ‘hakumat
[government]’ aid and assistance they received
during and after the disaster. The most common
answer was:
Kuchbheenaheen [nothing at all].
For instance, in a focus group discussion with
men and women from a village in Badin district,
a woman in her late twenties said:
They [the government] gave us nothing. Everyone has
to help oneself. In such a super flood, no one provided
us with a rescue vehicle or any other assistance. We
went to Badin [city] on foot. We reached Badin on
self-help basis.5 From here we travelled up to [the
city of] Malkani, and then went to Badin. We took
our small children and travelled 30–35km in the rain.
This interviewee was explicit in stating that they
received no support from the state during the
disaster and detailed how difficult it was for
them to reach safety and yet they managed only
because they helped themselves. In this
discussion, the interviewees used the words
‘responsibility of ’ and ‘failure of ’ most often,
when talking about the ‘government’. They
expressed disappointment with a state that they
expected would help but instead was ‘absent’ and
unable to help during and post-disaster. A
middle-aged man who was part of this focus
group discussion clearly stated:
No one helped us. We were looking for help, the
government had even declared it an ‘emergency’ [used
the English word] but no one came to us to help.
Nazims [local-level leaders]6 were inefficient, they are
inefficient and will be inefficient in the future,
inshallah [‘God willing’, added sarcastically].
These individuals categorically stated that the
government had done ‘nothing’, and given them
‘nothing’ after the disaster. I then specifically
asked this group of about 20 adults if they had
received any money through the social protection
programme that provided unconditional cash
transfers to the head of every household who was
resident in a flood-affected area. In response to
that enquiry there was a resounding ‘yes’ all
around. The money was provided to the flood
affectees in 2011 through an ATM card called
the Pakistan Card that was linked to Pakistan’s
digital database NADRA (National Database and
Registration Authority) to ensure that all
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households in government notified flood-affected
areas received the cash transfer. This
programme was the successor of the Watan Card
(UNHCR 2010) cash transfer scheme instituted
after the 2010 floods. The interviewees went on
to inform me that each household in this village
had received a Pakistan Card and had withdrawn
the full value of their cash transfer from the
ATM machine. 
Further conversations and questions also
revealed that 12 households7 out of a total of
about 150 households in the village were
regularly receiving money orders from the
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), an
unconditional cash transfer targeting the poorest
households in the county (BISP 2011).These cash
transfers had also reached the women during the
floods, or were made in aggregate if a payment
was missed due to logistical problems raised by
the floods (pers. comm. June 2012).
Referring to the policy document, National
Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) of 2007,
published by the National Planning Commission
of Pakistan, Gazdar points out that it
‘represented a major advance in Pakistan in
policy thinking about social protection’. The
NSPS defined the role of social protection in
more conventional terms as social insurance and
risk mitigation as well as taking on the more
challenging goal of ‘social transformation’. BISP
has an enviable record of being the first cash
transfer programme to reach 7 per cent of all
households in the country (Gazdar 2011), 40 per
cent of the population living below the poverty
line (BISP 2011) and is also ‘by far the most
gender-sensitive safety net intervention in
Pakistan’ (Khan and Qutub 2010). It is, however,
the universal cash transfers in the form of the
Watan Card and the Pakistan Card provided to
all households in the government-declared
flooded regions that were almost unprecedented
in a post-disaster context in Pakistan.8
In my research site of about 50 villages in
Thatta, Badin and Tharparkar, interviewees in
only one village complained of not having
received the Pakistan Card despite being in the
flood-affected zone. All other interviewees, in
each of the villages, in each of the three districts
admitted to having received the first instalment
of the Pakistan and Watan Cards, though almost
all were frustrated that they were still owed
either one (in the case of the Pakistan Card) or
more (in the case of the Watan Card)
instalments that they had not received. Given
that approximately 1.6 million Watan Cards
(UNHCR 2010) and about 1.25 million Pakistan
Cards were issued (The News 2012), these were
very large programmes with a record outreach. 
The smart cards and ATM cards were a part of
state interventions in the disaster-affected areas
but it seemed harder for individuals to make the
link back to the state. On the other hand, if a
District Coordination Officer (DCO) or local
politician had braved heavy rains to reach out to
flood affectees with aid and relief, it was always
mentioned in the context of a concerned, aid-
delivering state. For many interviewees seeing an
individual as a manifestation of the state was
important. In a small town in Thatta district,
when asked about state support after the floods,
three different interviewees mentioned the name
of a Deputy District Officer (DDO) who had
worked diligently to provide relief goods to flood-
affected populations. He represented the state
reaching out to affected individuals and families.
At the same time, however, almost none of the
interviewees mentioned Watan or Pakistan
Cards when questioned on state support post-
disaster. Only when directly asked about these
schemes or prompted to provide details about
them did these cash transfers come up in
interview conversations.
It is however important to mention that a few
individuals were able to recognise the ways in
which the state had reached out to affected
individuals after the disaster. In one village in
Thatta a middle-aged man, Interviewee 2,
repeated the phrase ‘Jo khaakayna many na Hindu
naMusalmaan9 [implied meaning: one who accepts
favours and then refuses to acknowledge them, is
a hypocrite]’ twice in the interview. He admitted
to having voted for the incumbent Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP), and perhaps because of
that political allegiance, detailed the way that
the state provided him and most of his village
support after the floods of 2010.
When we were in the ‘sarkari’ [state-run (relief)]
camps the people of Karachi [where the camp was
based] gave us a lot of respect, treated us well and
looked after us, as did the government… They assisted
us in a difficult time. In fact their assistance far
exceeded our expectation… It was in the first 3–4
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years of Mr Bhutto’s government10 that the poor people
were able to breathe a sigh of relief, after that it is only
now during Mr Zardari’s tenure11 that the poor people
have been provided assistance. Something or the other
is being done to help the poor, whether it is in the form
of Watan Card, Pakistan Card or the Benazir Income
Support Programme. We were never aware of such
programmes in the past, we had never even heard of
them. The people in our village had never even seen an
ATM. They did not know what an ATM card was
(pers. comm. May 2012).
While they may sound like words of a party
loyalist, the point Interviewee 2 made is still
valid and very significant. This was the first time
that the state in Pakistan reached out to affected
individuals, suffering from the effects of a
disaster, or poverty more generally, in a direct
and responsive manner. Individuals received
BISP money orders (now smart cards) or Watan
or Pakistan ATM Cards, simply by virtue of the
fact that they were affected ‘citizens’, signaling
what Gazdar calls ‘a paradigm shift’ in
state–citizen relations. The near universal
targeting and link to the national database
(NADRA) of these state interventions aims to
establish a lasting interaction or contract
between the state and its citizens. The emerging
social contract accepts the people as the
responsibility of the state.
This ‘paradigm shift’ however was not pulled out
of a hat, neither did it occur in an unsystematic
or entirely coincidental way. On the contrary,
using ‘social protection for nation building’ was
an explicit goal in the strategy paper, ‘Final
Report of the Panel of Economists’ prepared by
the Planning Commission, Government of
Pakistan in April of 2010 just months before the
first flooding disaster. In writing about the
conflict-affected areas of the country, the
document clearly stated, ‘Social protection must
be part of the strategy to reclaim the space and
legitimacy for the state in Pakistan, through
protection to the basic entitlements of people in
the conflict-affected areas’ (Pelling and Dill
2010). This policy statement is particularly
significant when looking at the role such state
interventions played after the flooding disaster
in Sindh. Pelling and Dill’s empirical work
confirms that politically ‘disaster outcomes are
path dependent’, an observation supported by
one of the earliest works in disaster politics by
Albala-Bertrand. She noted that ‘responses to
disasters vary according to the political visions of
the major power-holders (endogenous and
exogenous) and tend to reveal dominant political
philosophies’. Hence it logically follows that
because the state in Pakistan had already begun
to conceptualise and implement (with
geographical limitations) a policy of citizenship
through social protection, the flooding disaster
was able to push that objective along. 
It is also noteworthy that in all areas of Thatta,
Badin and Tharparkar where I did fieldwork, it
was common for people to comment on a
‘useless’, ‘incompetent’ state that did nothing for
them. In Tharparkar, however, the narrative of
the region being an ‘underdeveloped marginal
area (pasmandaalaqa)’ was repeated most
frequently. Yet, even in what was considered the
most peripheral area of Sindh, Interviewee 3, a
small shop-owner in his late twenties from a
town in Tharparkar, articulated what many
interviewees had described as the main role of
the state – to provide social services and policy
interventions. When I directly asked him what he
thought was the responsibility of the state
towards its citizens, his reply was:
It is like this, firstly we need ‘light’ [he used the
English word ‘light’ commonly used in Pakistan to
refer to electricity] in our village, we also need a water
line and we need roads. 
In a different part of the conversation he had
stated:
For our village roads have reached and electricity has
reached as well. But till now a water line has not
been provided to Nagarparkar. Work on the water line
is under way but it is still about 25km away from us
(pers. comm. August 2012).
Interviewee 3 and some of his friends, who
eventually contributed towards this discussion,
were clear that the state left a lot to be desired.
Yet without realising, through his own admission
and the criteria of the citizens and the indicators
with which they judged the state, it was
particularly difficult to declare the state as
‘absent’ in this part of Sindh in Pakistan. The
village in Nagarparkar had direct street access to
a double-lane highway, it had an electricity
connection and water was 25km closer to being
at its doorstep than ever before. Hence, the
emerging social contract also seems to be
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constructed of a citizenry that demands more
from the state and a state that in its capacity has
to attempt to deliver. 
4 Disasters and the social contract in southern
Sindh
More than a decade after Alex de Waal’s seminal
work on famines and the social contract was
published (De Waal 1997), there is renewed
interest in understanding how disasters are
affecting the interaction of the state and citizens
in different parts of the world. O’Brien et al.’s
recent work on changing social contracts in the
face of climate-induced uncertainty examines
case studies from industrialised societies and
concludes that social contracts need to be
‘continually’ renegotiated so that they may be
able to respond to and create change (O’Brien
et al. 2009). Warner acknowledges that to rethink
political structures and begin this process of
renegotiation of the social contract ‘it is
therefore attractive for those seeking to break
the status quo to push for the declaration of a
disaster’ (Warner, forthcoming) and use it as a
platform for transformative change. This
acceptance of a disaster makes it possible for
political actors but also ‘ordinary people’ to
challenge, question and criticise powerbrokers,
something they may be unable to do otherwise. It
may even be referred to as ‘disaster citizenship’
because ‘it makes citizens out of victims, even if
such empowerment comes at a heavy price’
(Pantti and Wahl-Jorgensen 2011).
De Waal presents a powerful argument in
stating, ‘freedom from famine (disaster) arises
within a specific form of social contract,
developed through political struggle’ (De Waal
1996). In the post-disaster context of southern
Sindh, sociopolitical struggles are taking place to
challenge the nature of the interaction between
the state and its citizens. Forces of change,
including the flooding in southern Sindh are
encouraging people to demand more of the state
and its agents, who they helped put in office.
This article attempted to demonstrate the policy
response of the state to the disaster, the extent to
which it was successful in meeting people’s
expectations and how this impacts an emerging
social contract in southern Sindh. While more
research is needed, my research indicates that a
devastating disaster, such as the floods in Sindh,
resulted in people immediately demanding an
interaction with a state that delivers aid and
institutes policy solutions. Traditional views on a
kinship- or patronage-based social contract were
almost drowned out with the rising tide of the
Indus River. The state for its part was neither as
‘absent’ nor as ‘useless’ as the dominant
narrative seemed to suggest.
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Notes
1 Women in the lowest and middle-income
brackets in three villages located between
Karachi and Balochistan: Rais Mehmood Old
(RMO), Rais Mehmood New (RMN), Noor
Mohamed Goth (NMG) and Kundu.
2 Religious teacher.
3 December 1971 was when East Pakistan
became the independent state of Bangladesh
and Pakistan came into being in its
contemporary form.
4 ‘Watan’ means ‘country’ and the Watan Card
refers to a cash transfer programme instituted
by the state for flood victims.
5 They used the Urdu phrase ‘apni madad aap’, or
the Sindhi phrase ‘paanji madad’ which
translates as ‘self-help’. This phrase was
frequently used by flood-affected interviewees,
to emphasise that they were left to fend for
themselves, and the ‘state’ interventions and
instruments were not available.
6 The Nazim was the chief elected official of a
local government, at the level of the union,
tehsil, or district under the Local Government
Ordinance of 2001 that has now been replaced.
7 In this village, most of these were female-
headed households. The women receiving the
BISP cash transfers were widows and had
limited income opportunities.
8 Cash transfers in the post-disaster context in
Pakistan were first distributed after the
Kashmir earthquake of 2005; however, they
were implemented in a consolidated scheme
such as the Watan or Pakistan Cards.
9 Literal translation: One, who eats and doesn’t
acknowledge it, is neither Hindu nor Muslim.
10 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was founder of the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Prime
Minister of Pakistan 1973–7.
11 Asif Ali Zardari is the incumbent President of
Pakistan since 2008 and co-chairman of the
PPP.
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